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Available online xxxxAt present, PPP (Public-Private Partnership) plays an important role in infrastructure project development. This is at-
tributable to the fact that many governments around the world have a budget constraint andmay try to prioritize their
budget for other developments in need. Allowing a private sector to participate in investment is an important step to-
wards the cost-saving for a government. The private sector has an advantageous opportunity in the investment partner-
ship, and public users tend to have superior service. Thai government envisages potential advantages of PPP and
adopts this practice in various projects. However, the newmega project linking 3 airports is one of the first highspeed
rail projects in Thailand ofwhich the Thai government has insufficient experience. There are serious concernswhether
the PPP adoption could enable a viable option. Therefore, this study aims to analyze benefits and risks of PPP adoption
in the High-Speed Rail Project Linking 3 Airports in Thailand. Lifecycle assessment has been carried out by breaking
down the project into various phases. Field data have been gathered from different sources such as an official website,
feasibility study reports, annual reports of related government agencies, and opinions from technical experts in private
sector. Financial analysis is used to analyze and calculate related financial values. The results reveal that the PPP adop-
tion in this project yields different benefits and risks depending on each phase of the project. Adopting PPP can over-
come key limitations and provide some real benefits that the traditional approach cannot. Simultaneously, there are
risks incurred from the PPP adoption due to the complexity in PPP partnership such additional transaction costs and
interrelation complexity. However, the risks can be managed by a rigorous plan and practice. Both governmental
and private sectors need to collaborate to ascertain the project's success.Keywords:
Public private partnership
High speed rail
Project risk
Project benefit
Traditional approach
Whole life cycle1. Introduction
PPP (Public-Private Partnership) plays an important role in any invest-
ment that needs high initial capital such as a railway project. Thailand
has also started using this approach to invest in infrastructure projects.
The most recent project that has adopted this investment approach is
the new High-Speed Rail Project, connecting 3 airports including
Suvarnabhumi International Airport, Don Mueang International Airport,
and U-Tapao International Airport (Eastern Economic Corridor Office,
2018). PPP is the mutually preferred choice because the government aims
to retain political, legal and project selection risks, while the private sector
aims to retain construction and operational risks. At the same time, both
private and governmental sectors can share economic and market risks.
PPP can then promote the smoothness of the project's implementation be-
cause no party has to take care of an excessive level of risk (Ogunbode,
2016; Kaewunruen et al., 2016).koolchai),
vier Ltd. This is an open access artIn recent years, PPP has gained popularity because of its advantages. In
the government's perspective, PPP can be adopted to generate financial
value and allocate operational risk to the private sector, which has experience
and expertise in a particular business or a specific technicalfield.Moreover, it
gives an opportunity for the government to learn and receive specialized tech-
nologies from the private sector. In the private sector's viewpoint, PPP can
promote business opportunities because the private sector can advise the gov-
ernment on efficient operations, and some pressing risks can be alleviated by
the government e.g. certain legal processes. Through public users' eyes, better
value-for-money services can be stemmed from the expertise of the private
sector and the appropriate price subsidized by the government (National
Science Technology and Innovation Policy Office, 2015).
In contrast, PPP also has some disadvantages. PPP is more complex than
traditional investment approaches so that there are additional risks from
PPP. Moreover, PPP is generally a long-term agreement and is compara-
tively inflexible so it cannot envisage and predict all events in the future.
Some people concern that PPP can either instigate the government's insta-
bility or lead to the government's loss if the partnership agreement is not
properly written due to the lack of experience (Government of the
Republic of Lithuania., 2015).icle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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mega project period. In this study, the project lifecycle phases are broken
down into pre-construction, construction, operation, maintenance, and
decommissioning. Each phase will be considered to compare the differ-
ences between PPP and the traditional investment approaches in order to
identify benefits and risks. This study focuses on the primary revenue
only, which is stemmed from the fare income.
2. Background
The high-speed rail (HSR) project connecting 3 airports will be imple-
mented on existing infrastructures and route corridors of existing ARL
(Airport Rail Link Line). This HSR project adopts the standard-gauge rail
track system. Its additional extensions are from Phayathai – Don Mueang
and Lad Krabang – U-Tapao (Rayong). The project will connect 3
international airports - Suvarnabhumi Airport, Don Mueang Airport, and
U-Tapao Airport. Its corridor contains 9 high-speed stations, namely, Don
Mueang, Bang Sue, Makkasan, Suvarnabhumi, Chachoengsao, Chonburi,
Sriracha, Pattaya, and U-Tapao.
The business space development to support the railway services in
Makkasan area, which belongs to SRT (State Railway of Thailand) of 150
rai, needs to be integrated with the development of the HSR line extensions
to maximize benefits and value. Moreover, the area of 25 rai at Sri Racha
station can be also re-developed as a Transit-Oriented Development
(TOD) immediately (Fig. 1).
The total estimate cost of the HSR project is shown as follows:
The duration of PP is agreed to be 50 years while the construction phase
spans over 5 years. The project is planned to commence the operations in
2023. The HSR project linking 3 airports will be operated as a PPP with
an initial contract period of 50 years. The detail of relevant parties in the
private sector consortium in this PPP can be shown as follows:
3. Literature review
Despite significant advantages, PPP cannot guarantee the success of a
project. This is because there exist uncertainties and risks from the com-
plexity of the project and its stakeholder interrelationship. Li et al. (n.d.)
collected the relevant risks in PPP projects by classifying risks at each
level, consisting of micro, meso, and macro risks. The micro-level risks are
incurred within a PPP organization. The macro-level risks are ecological
variables and the meso-level risks are ranged somewhere between macro
and micro levels. Wu et al. (2018) indicated the risk-sharing between the
public and private sectors in infrastructure projects in China by applying
the 3-dimension framework. They applied the Analytic Network Process
(ANP) to determine the weight of risk factors. Then, they assessed risk
level by considering 3 aspects, uncontrollability, probability, and losses.
Their study identified the top 5 risks, including imperfect industrial stan-
dard, unstable policy, insufficient operation income, lack of experience in
PPP, and imperfect charging technology, respectively (Binti Sa’adin et al.,
2016a, 2016b, 2016c). From the study, it can be seen that Thailand is
very prone to these risks since Thailandwill implement PPP in the HSR pro-
ject for the first time (Kaewunruen et al., 2018; Alawad et al., 2020). Thai
officials do not have sufficient experience on HSR so they will implement
the project based on the standard and technology from other countries.
There are many interconnected risks in PPP projects and the details of
risk can be different depending on the type of project. Ogunbode (2016)
grouped risks into the following categories: political risk, legal risk, project
selection risk, construction risk, operation risk, economic risk, and market
risk. Then, he used a questionnaire survey to collect data from 155 experts
in PPP projects in Nigeria who had more than 5-year experience in infra-
structure concession projects. The result from the analysis revealed the
most appropriate parties to deal with each risk. The public sector should
take care of political risk, legal risk, and project selection risk. The private
sector should be responsible for construction risk and operation risk. Both
of them should mutually share economic and market risks. This is consis-
tent with a study by Chan (2011) who found that the public sector prefers2to take political, legal, and social risks. Meanwhile, the private sector pre-
fers to take construction risks and operational risks, which are in accor-
dance with Meng et al. (2018), who concluded that the private sector
prefers to take construction, operation, and relationship risks. Also, both
the public and private sectors prefer to take economic and market risks so
they are willing to share these risks together.
One of themost significant benefits of PPP adoption is assigning particular
risks to certain parties, who can best deal with those particular risks. Although
PPP is popularly used, the success of a project can be uncertain. It is found that
most PPP failures are resulted from inappropriate risk allocation and a lack of
information to make projects succeed in specific situations (Chou and
Pramudawardhani, 2015). Transferring all risks to the private sector is not a
good practice. Mouraviev and Kakabadse (2013) studied 11 kindergarten
PPP projects in Kazakhstan and found that completely transferring risk to the
private sector was expensive and could significantly induce the over-budget
situation for the public sector and value of PPP. In addition, it missed the
opportunity to create incentives for operation quality improvement and take
advantage of economies of scale (Kaewunruen et al., 2015; Kaewunruen and
Lee, 2017; Rungskunroch et al., 2020; Kaewunruen et al., 2020). Therefore,
it can be seen that proper risk sharing is the best way to optimize the benefits
of applying the PPP approach.
It is apparent that, even though PPP is an effective way to execute mega
projects, it needs proper risk allocation to assure that projects can be run
smoothly. There are many studies that have discussed risk allocation in PPP
projects. Depending on the type of project, each study may have different ap-
proaches to allocate particular risks to the public sector, private sector, or both.
4. Methodology
This study is performed by conducting critical literature review,
collecting governmental statistics and information, as well as expert inter-
views, in order to gather required data, such as the performance of the pri-
vate sector and the governmental synergy. Some data are collected from
related authorities and agencies such as the State Railway of Thailand
(SRT). Some assumptions used in the estimation will be made by relative
correlations using available relevant data from other sources such as the
World Bank or the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
(i) For qualitative analysis, the content assessment will be conducted to
compare with other projects with the same characteristic.
(ii) For quantitative analysis, financial evaluation will play an important
role in this study. First, the cash flow of the project is considered in
order to determine the net income and revenue of each year. This can
be conducted by using the total financial return of the project with
the determined discount rate and the growth of passenger number.
The discount rate can be obtained from the official project report on
the section of economic return (The Eastern Economic Corridor
Policy Committee, 2018). From the official report, the financial return
of the project is 127,985million THBwhen the discount rate during the
1st-50th year and 51st-100th year are 6.06% and 2.5% respectively
(The Eastern Economic Corridor Policy Committee, 2018). The growth
of passenger numbers can be obtained from the feasibility report of the
project (State Railway of Thailand, 2017), which equal to 2.34%.
When the cashflowof the project is known, the benefits and risks of ap-
plying PPP in this project can be calculated in terms of net present
values, which can be used to benchmarkwith the traditional approach.
5. Results
5.1. Benefits of PPP adoption for the highspeed rail project linking 3 airports in
Thailand
5.1.1. Benefits from synergy
Firstly, revenue synergy is a potential gain when two or more compa-
nies aremerged together. It is attributable to the fact that the merging com-
panies can sell more products and services, or get more revenue than a
Fig. 1. Concept of the High Speed Rail Linking 3 Airports Project (The Eastern Economic Corridor Policy Committee, 2018).
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erated from the better performance of the combined business management
in the railway operation, TOD, commercial, and maintenance in the opera-
tion and maintenance phase. Secondly, cost synergy is a potential cost re-
duction stemmed from the synergy. For general example, PPP can save
costs in terms of logistics, storage, marketing expenses, training expenses
(from knowledge sharing and technology transfer), staff reduction, system
integration, and consolidation (Vaidya, 2019; Rungskunroch et al., 2019).
Thirdly, financial synergy is a benefit of lower interest (or lower weighted
average cost of capital) because the company with more capital capacity
has better capital structure and cash flow. The bank can then offer a better
interest rate of a loan. Normally, the interest rate of the loan for a contractor
who bids for the public infrastructure is around the Minimum Loan Rate
(MRR) + 2% (Kasikornbank Public Company Limited, 2018a). From
Kasikornbank Public Company Limited (2018b), the interest rate of the
loan for contractors is around 8.25% per year. However, from the negotia-
tion with the government, CP can obtain a special interest rate of 3%
(Komchadluek, 2019) while the normal interest rate whose CP needs to
pay for the loan is higher, around 4%–6% (Longtunman, 2017). From
Table 1, the total cost of the construction is 103,747 million THB
(117,227 million THB is subsidized by the government (Bunloet, 2019))
and the cost of the right to operate the existing ARL is 10,671 million
THB. The benefit of financial synergy can be calculated from the interest
rates of contractors and CP. It can be assumed that the interest rate of CP
is around 5%. Therefore, the total benefit from the financial synergy can
be estimated to be 5660 million THB.
5.1.2. Benefits from legal issues
The highspeed rail project linking 3 airports is an essential part of the
Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC) according to the government's economic
policy. Therefore, the highspeed rail project is prioritized and receives the
benefits of EEC, including Matching Grants for Investment, Permission to
own land, Rights to lease state land, and 5-year work permit (Eastern
Economic Corridor Office, 2018).
5.1.3. Tax benefit
Initially, this project gets a benefit from the exemption from corporate
income tax for 13 years according to the Investment Promotion Act
(Eastern Economic Corridor Office, 2018). In Thailand, the rate of corpo-
rate income tax is 20% of the net profit (Revenue Department, 2018).
From the EEC study, the financial return is expected to be 127,985 million
THB (The Eastern Economic Corridor Policy Committee, 2018). According
to the feasibility study of the HSR project (State Railway of Thailand,
2017), the average growth rate of ridership is 2.34%. This rate is used to as-
sume the growth of the primary revenue. By thismethodology, financial re-
turn in the first year of the operation is 1945 million THB and the return inTable 1
Cost of the High-Speed Rail Linking 3 Airports Project (State Railway of Thailand,
2017).
Cost components Million THB
Government Private sector
High speed rail
Land acquisition 3570
Civil works 120,515
E&M 24,712
Rolling stocks (initial) 15,491
Others 4430
Makkasan land development
Makkasan area 40,193
TOD around HSR station 3513
Public utility 1449
Existing ARL cost
Right to operate existing ARL 10,671
Existing ARL civil works 22,558
Total 26,128 220,974
4the 50th year is 6041 million THB. The NPV (net present value) of the pro-
ject during thefirst 50 years is expected to be 43,512million THB. From the
estimation, NPV during the first 13 years of the operation is 29,157million
THB. Based on BEM's financial report (Securities and Exchange
Commission, 2019), the average net profit margin of BEM is 21.62%.
Therefore, the profit is estimated to be 6304 million THB and the benefit
from tax exemption is around 1261 million THB. Other tax benefits are
the exemption of import duties on machinery and the corporate income
tax rate of 17%.
5.1.4. Benefits of land acquisition
The land acquisition process can be more certain and reliable because,
in Thailand, the power to expropriate the land by the government and the
private sector are different. The private sector has more flexibility and
more capital to buy the land. The process can be done quickly. However,
owners of the lands have the right to deny the sale of their lands to the pri-
vate sector. This implies that the private sector may not be able to buy all
desirable lands while the government has full authority according to the
laws to expropriate land. Therefore, the process can bemore certain and re-
liable because eventually, the government can obtain all desirable lands. In
general, the process of land acquisition takes around 2 years for the govern-
ment in the cases that the landowner does not want their lands to be expro-
priated. This makes it much easier to plan the project because the time
frame of the process can be reliably predicted.
5.1.5. Improved risk profile
For the traditional investment approach, the government has to take the
risk alone. However, when adopting PPP, the government can share some
risks with the private sector or transfer certain risks to the private sector.
Vice versa, the private sector does not need to handle all risks by them-
selves. Overall, the risk profile can be improved because there is no single
party that takes excessive risk alone.
5.1.6. Increasing financial capacity and certainty
The adoption of PPPmodel can attract significant funds from the private
sector. Moreover, in reality, the private sector is an alliance of private com-
panies. Its financial capacity is higher than the government's one. The alli-
ance of private sector improves the financial certainty, lowering the
likelihood of unforeseen circumstances due to its higher commercial
experience.
5.1.7. Construction cost contingency
The overall cost of the construction tends to be lower when compared
with the traditional investment approach. In practice, contingency (associ-
ated with total risks) is included in the bidding price. If it is reduced, the
construction cost can be saved. To consider the benefit of cost contingency,
the contingency included in the construction cost needs to be assessed.
From the authors' experience and expert interview, Thai contractors usually
include 10% of contingency in the total estimated construction cost. This
can be evidenced bymany relevant sources. Designing Buildings Ltd. stated
that 10% of contingency is included in the construction cost (Designing
Buildings Ltd., 2019), also by Compton Construction (2015). Based on the
available information, the cost shown in Table 1 is calculated by setting
the contingency to be 10%. The data from the Asian Development Bank
(ADB) related to different railway projects are also collected to determine
the contingency of the projects. The contingency of 20 projects during the
past 5 years (2015–2019) from Asian Development Bank (Asian Develop-
ment Bank, 2019d; Asian Development Bank, 2019b; Asian Development
Bank, 2019d; Asian Development Bank, 2018c; Asian Development Bank,
2017c; Asian Development Bank, 2018d; Asian Development Bank,
2018a; Asian Development Bank, 2018e; Asian Development Bank,
2018b; Asian Development Bank, 2019a; Asian Development Bank,
2017b; Asian Development Bank, 2016a; Asian Development Bank,
2016b; Asian Development Bank, 2016c; Asian Development Bank,
2015b; Asian Development Bank, 2015a; Asian Development Bank,
2015c; Asian Development Bank, 2014; Asian Development Bank, 2017a;
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2019c, 2019d) is 5.7%. When the contingency decreases from 10% to
5.7%, the benefit derived from cost saving is 7965 million THB.
5.1.8. Better performance in time, cost, and quality
Note that there are 3 contractors in the partnership of this project and
they are also the main investors of the project. Considering principal-
agent concept, this can partially guarantee that the time, cost, and quality
of the project will be better when comparedwith the traditional investment
approach. As the key stakeholders, they need the project to be completed as
soon as possible because the PPP period is limited to 50 years only. If the
completion of the project is late, it means that they have a higher cost
due to delays and a shorter time to generate revenues. In addition, they
need to save costs as much as possible since every expenditure is their in-
vestment.With respect to quality, because the construction issues can affect
the operational reliability, the service quality can thus affect the revenue.
The private sector will need to prioritize the quality of the construction in
order to assure that there will be no disruption in the revenue generation.
5.1.9. Knowledge sharing and technology transfer
Although this project will be fully operated by the private sector, the
government has a key role to control, assure and monitor the services dur-
ing operations. The government has an opportunity to learn from the pri-
vate sector in terms of management, operation, and technology. This will
add benefits for the government in the future when new projects exist. In
the future, the government can use the gained experience to either handle
projects by itself or manage PPP projects better.
5.1.10. Addition fees from right to operate the existing ARL
This project includes the right to operate the existing ARL and allows
the private sector to exploit the ARL's infrastructures. From the SRTET An-
nual report (S.R.T. Electrified Train Company Limited, 2018), SRTET, who
currently operates the existing ARL, hardly has any profit from the opera-
tion. Appointing the private sector to operate the integrated system seems
to be the better option for the government, private sector, and users. The
existing ARL will form a part of the new and highly integrated network,
which will be developed within this project.
To estimate the revenue and expense of the existing ARL, the data from
annual reports have been analyzed. Revenue and expense of ARL by SRTET
during 2014–2018 are shown in Fig. 2.
To estimate the future revenue and expense, the time frame of the pro-
ject needs to be considered. From the project plan, the construction will
start in 2020 and take 5 years to be completed. Therefore, the operation
will commence in 2025. The overall duration of PPP is 50 years. From theFig. 2. Revenue and expense of ARL (S.R.T. E
5timeframe and trend line, revenue and expense of each year of the agree-
ment can be estimated. To be more realistic, the discount rate is considered
to be the discount rate of ARL, which is 3% according to the study (The
Eastern Economic Corridor Policy Committee, 2018). The estimated reve-
nue and expense of existing ARL during PPP (2025 to 2074) are 16,231
and 17,117 million THB respectively. However, the cost for the right to op-
erate the existing ARL according to Table 1 is 10,671 million THB. In sum-
mary, the benefit in the viewpoint of the private sector is the additional
revenue from the integration of the existing and new systemswhile the ben-
efit in the viewpoint of the government is 11,557 million THB [10,671 +
(17,117 - 16,231)].
5.1.11. Improvement of organization culture
Private sector employees are normally more enthusiastic than state en-
terprise employees. The work quality of the private sector is relatively bet-
ter as well. This is because the work pressure is relatively different in
Thailand. State enterprise employees have very little chance of being laid
off so they could pay less attention to theirwork. On the other hand, private
sector employees have more work pressure because their performance af-
fects their job security. Therefore, the efficiency of the work can be im-
proved when adopting PPP (Table 2).
5.1.12. Lower internal organizational problem
In some cases, internal organizational problems can be the cause of low
management efficiency. In this case, the labor union is often referred to.
The State Railway Union of Thailand (SRUT) is a labor union of SRT. The
original purpose of SRUT is to protect the employees' right. However, hav-
ing bargaining power in the labor union can obstruct the development. For
example, in 2015, the government had an idea to found the Department of
Rail Transport to take care of the railway system in the country. SRUT op-
posed the founding of the Department of Rail Transport because they
were concerned that it may reduce employment. In contrast, adopting
PPP enables the private sector to operate and maintain the project by its
workforces. Therefore, the project will not be severely affected by trade
unions and can be performed much smoother.
5.2. Risks of adopting PPP in the High-Speed Rail Project Linking 3 Airports in
Thailand
5.2.1. Fairness of the agreement
The fairness of the agreement is a critical issue because each party nat-
urally seeks to gain benefits. The government needs to consider the public
benefit. At the same time, the incentives must enough to attract the private
sector to invest. The government has to balance the benefit for eachlectrified Train Company Limited, 2018).
Table 2
Companies in PPP of the High-Speed Rail Linking 3 Airports (InfoQuest, 2018).
Parties Share
(%)
Business
Charoen Pokphand Holding Limited
(CP)
70 Agribusiness and food, retail and
distribution, and the
telecommunications industries
Bangkok Expressway and Metro Public
Company Limited (BEM) and CH
Karnchang Public Company Limited
(CK)
15 Transportation company and
Construction
China Railway Construction Corpora-
tion Limited (CRCC)
10 Construction and engineering
Italian-Thai Development Public
Company (ITD)
5 Construction and Railway system
Possible investment partnership
Japan Overseas Infrastructure Invest-
ment Corporation for Transport &
Urban Development (JOINT)
Finance
CITIC Group Corporation (China) Finance
China Resources (Holdings) Company
Limited
Energy, retail, property
Japan Bank for International Coopera-
tion (JBIC)
Finance
Ferrovie dello Stato Italiane (Italy) Operation and maintenance system
Siemen (Germany) Rolling stock and signaling system
Hyundai (South Korea) Rolling stock and signaling system
CRRC-Sifang (China) Rolling stock
J. Sresakoolchai, S. Kaewunruen / Transportation Research Interdisciplinary Perspectives 5 (2020) 100116stakeholder; otherwise, either the public will lose out or there will be no in-
vestment from the private sector. For the private sector, its first priority is to
generate a profit. Theywill invest in this project only when they can predict
that the project will be profitable. At the same time, because this project
needs a high capital, the risk will be high. The careful consideration must
be taken otherwise the private sector will suffer because the total duration
of this PPP is 50 years.
5.2.2. Delay of negotiation
Both the government and the private sector need to consider the agree-
ment carefully. The negotiation may take a long time until every party
agrees on the agreement. For example, the latest negotiation took place
on 7 February 2019 that CP has 11 conditions to negotiate with the govern-
ment to maintain its benefits. Unfortunately, on 9 April 2019, these condi-
tions were no longer considered because they are contrary to the tender
conditions (Bunloet, 2019).
5.2.3. More complexity and excessive contract variation
PPP results in more complexity due to the nature of PPP that involves
many more parties. Although the variation is normal in construction pro-
jects, the involvement of many parties can result in excessive deviation be-
cause different parties may have different demands and opinions. In a
traditional project, the variation is an important cause of project delays or
cost overrun. In PPP projects, it tends to be worsened because there are
many more parties related.
5.2.4. Inflexibility of the agreement
The duration of the project is generally long and it is difficult to predict
events and uncertainties. However, both the government and the private
sector cannot change the agreement whenever they wish. The inflexibility
of the agreement is a significant risk for the project during the pre-
construction phase because the agreement done in this phase will be effec-
tive from the start to the end of the project.
5.2.5. Political interference
Political interference is the most significant problem in infrastructure
projects. The projectmay be affected by the change in the government's pol-
icies or the direct involvement of the government. The government may
want to control and improve the performance of the project; however, it6is likely to negatively affect the project as well. Moreover, it affects the con-
fidence of the private sector both in this project and other PPP projects in
the future.
5.2.6. Corruption and bribery
Corruption and briberymake projectsmore expensive and less efficient.
At the same time, the private sector will lack confidence in the investment.
The agreement and the tendering need to be transparent to ensure that the
government will deliver the best performance while the private sector can
use the capital with full efficiency. At the same time, passengers and public
users should be delivered with the best services.
5.2.7. Completion of criteria evaluation
Generally, the government will set the criteria for the private sector to
meet in order to deliver reasonably good services to passengers. The com-
pletion of criteria evaluation is critical because it is related to the revenue,
fine, and serviceability of the project. Lack of the completion of criteria can
cause a dispute between the government and the private sector when the
project is in full operation.
5.2.8. Monopoly
A monopoly concerns many people because the private sector has the
right to operate this project for 50 years. At the same time, this project
has less competition because it is difficult to develop a large project, requir-
ing significant investments and large-scale services. To mitigate this risk,
the agreement needs to identify the revenue sharing in terms of profit in
order to ensure that the governmentwill not lose the benefit fromproviding
the complete right for the private sector to operate the project.
5.2.9. High-interest burden
The most significant risk of this project is the high interest rate of bor-
rowing. If the private sector borrows a significant amount of money, the
high interest needs to be returned. Besides the construction cost that the
private sector has to invest, the subsidy, which the government will support
the private sector, also causes the interest. This is because the government
will provide the subsidy after the construction is completed and the opera-
tion is opened. Therefore, during the first 5 years of the construction, if the
private sector needs to borrow a significant amount of money, they have to
pay the huge cost of interest as well, which is around 3517 million THB
annually.
Themaximum loan is limited by the interest, whichmust not exceed the
revenue of each year. In this case, the revenue of the first year is 1945 mil-
lion THB so the maximum loan is 64,831 million THB based on a 3% inter-
est rate. As a result, in the first year, the return is 1945 million THB, which
equal to the interest so there is no profit in the first year. However, the prin-
cipal decreases every year onward, as well as the interest, while the revenue
will continue to increase. From this scenario, the total return of the project
is 22,072 million THB or CBR (cost-benefit ratio) is 1.21 over 50 years. It
can be seen that the CBR of the project is not high and the higher loan re-
sults in a lower return. From the sensitivity analysis, the available loan is
sensitive to CBR as demonstrated in Fig. 3. It shows that the range of CBR
is 1.21–1.75 depending on the amount of the loan. Note that these scenarios
are based on primary revenues only.
5.2.10. Risk from high investment
In terms of construction cost, PPP plays an important role in the
achievement of the project. If the government does not subsidize for this
project, it is almost impossible that the primary revenue can generate a
profit. In fact, even though the project is subsidized by the government,
the change in the construction cost also affects the CBR of the project.
The result from the sensitivity analysis can be shown in Fig. 4. It can be
seen that if the private sector does not use the loan, the total construction
can increase up to 42%and CBRwill be 1. If the private sector uses themax-
imum loan to invest in the project, the total construction cost can increase
up to 15% and CBR will be 1. This is because the amount of the subsidy is
fixed and paid by the government. Then, the investment can be considered
Fig. 3. Sensitivity analysis of varied loan and CBR.
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the government subsidizes for this project. Note that the CBR shown in
Fig. 4 is for 50 years, and the primary businesses of each party can generate
more returns than the HSR business.
5.2.11. Overestimated ridership
Ridership highly affects the profitability of the HSR project because it
directly affects the primary revenue of the project. Normally, the passenger
forecast in railway projects tends to be an overestimation. Therefore, if the
exact ridership is less than the forecast, the primary revenue will decrease.
The sensitivity analysis of CBR can be demonstrated in Fig. 5. From Fig. 5, if
the private sector does not exploit the loan, the ridership can decrease up to
42% and the CBR will be 1. If the private sector uses the maximum loan to
invest in the project, the ridership can decrease up to 8% and the CBR will
remain as 1.
5.2.12. Lack of supporting infrastructure
This project is relevant to other projects in EEC, including U-Tapao
Airport, Laem Chabang Deep Sea Port, Map Ta Phut Port, and Phase II
Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) facilities. These other projectsFig. 4. Sensitivity analysis of varied cons
7can all affect the demand of the HSR project. If one project cannot be com-
pleted according to the plan, the demand forecast will not be precise and it
normally results in a negative effect.
5.2.13. Loss of professionalism
TheHSRwill bemaintained by the private sector. There is a risk that the
government may have a small participation in this project. Without a good
monitoring andmanagement system, the government can actually lose pro-
fessionalism and competency (Pikelchik, 2017) because the government
does not need to take any responsibility and risk during the maintenance
phase. In particular, this project is the first HSR project in Thailand, so los-
ing the opportunity to learn from the private sector is deplorable.
5.2.14. Cost and complexity of a transition period
During the transition period, the private sector transfers the ownership of
the project to the government. There are costs and complexities, which take
place during this transaction time. These could be unknown and uncertain.
Examples of these unknowns arefinancial andfiscal factors, regulations, tech-
nical issues, social issues, legal, and jurisdictions. Therefore, the PPP needs a
well-planned preparation and management to smooth the transition.truction cost and CBR over 50 years.
Fig. 5. Sensitivity analysis of varied ridership and CBR over 50 years.
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Based on the analysis results, adopting PPP in the High-Speed Rail Project
Linking 3 Airports in Thailand has 12 benefits and 14 risks compared to
implementing the traditional approach. The private sector will have benefit
from the synergy, which could extend further for secondary revenues. From
this study, the financial synergy on the primary revenue is 5660 million
THB from the saving of interest. This is because CP as the main company in
the party can get the loan with a lower interest rate when comparing to
other constrictors. At the same time, there are experienced contractors and
competent operators participating in the party. Therefore, the performance
of the project tends to be satisfactory. The private sector also gets the benefit
from the tax exemption of 1261 million THB because the government pro-
vides the privilege for the private sector to invest in this project. A lower con-
tingency cost can save the construction cost of 7965 million THB because
there are contractors participating in the PPP and they can be the responsible
investors in this project. Therefore, they do not need to include the high con-
tingency in the construction cost. The government also gets the benefit of
transferring the right to operate the existing ARL system onto the private sec-
tor of 11,557million THB during the PPP period. This can save the cost of the
government to invest in other projects. At the same time, the overall perfor-
mance and serviceability of the project tend to be improved because the pro-
ject is operated by the private sector that normally has more flexibility and
the capability to manage the project. From these, PPP can be considered as
a superior approach to invest in other mega infrastructure projects because
the government can save the budget to invest in other areas while the private
sector can have business opportunities that they do not have in the normal sit-
uation. However, PPP also has risks that every party needs to consider.
Importantly, the key risks of PPP adoption are the fairness and the agree-
ment and the completion of the criteria evaluation. The government allows
the private sector to invest in the infrastructure project and provides the op-
portunity for the private sector to make a profit from the secondary revenue.
However, the government has to balance the benefit to attract the private sec-
tor and public values to the country. If the offer is not attractive enough, there
would not be any private sector wanting to invest. If the offer is overly prom-
ised to the private sector, the country and public users will lose the societal
benefit of the project. The government has to establish the agreement that
is clear and fair. The criteria used to evaluate the performance of the private
sector needs to be transparent also to avoid the dispute in the future and to
maintain the quality of the project after being transferred to the government
at the end of the agreement. The construction cost and ridership are the other
important risks of the project. However, certain part of risks can be reduced
due to the fact that the government subsidizes the project. Without the sub-
sidy, it is very difficult to make the project financially viable due to the8high investment and low return, which are the typical characteristic of a
passenger railway project.
7. Conclusion
This study highlights the benefits and risks of the PPP adoption by com-
parison with the traditional investment approach in the High-Speed Rail
Project Linking 3 Airports in Thailand. The benefits and risks of adopting
PPP have been demonstrated and comparedwith the traditional investment
approach. It is clear that the PPP adoption is beneficial for the government,
the private sector, and general public users. However, there are various re-
lated risks that can negatively affect the government, the private sector, and
users simultaneously. Therefore, relevant risks need to be managed care-
fully to ensure that they can be limited as much as possible. Risk manage-
ment should be carried out by both the government and the private sector
with ample collaboration and coordination. Some principles and standards
can be used for risk management as well such as ISO 31010:2009.
The agreement is a very important initial step. The government and the
private sector have to effectively manage and negotiate for the fairness of
the agreement. At the same time, the private sector has to rigorously eval-
uate the project in details and plan to maximize the revenue of the project
because the returns from the primary revenue of the project are not very
significant. The private sector needs tofind a way to generate more second-
ary revenues from TOD and commercial development in order tomaximize
thefinancial viability and profit of the project. Otherwise, the projectmight
gain a higher risk until it may not yield a satisfactory profit. However, the
right to develop areas at Makkasan and Sri Racha is a highly valuable busi-
ness opportunity that the government provides to the private sector. The
private sector alone will not have this right unless the private sector takes
part in this PPP project. The secondary revenue from this opportunity has
significant potentials to overcome the low return of the fare revenue or
the primary revenue. Moreover, the synergy of the private sector can
offer an outstanding return on investment in Thailand's mega infrastructure
projects. It can create significant benefits that an individual's investment
cannot. On this ground, this HSR project will be a new paradigm for other
future projects, which will adopt this PPP investment approach.
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